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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2-(3)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue: Did Judge Lay cock err when she interpreted section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) of the Utah 
Code to require McKell, as a matter of law, to file its mechanic's lien foreclosure action within 
twelve months after last furnishing labor, material, equipment and services to a non-residential 
construction project, or within twelve months after cessation or abandonment of work on the 
project, rather than "within 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract 
not involving a residence" as plainly stated in the statute? 
Standard of Review: Judge Lay cock's ruling is subject to review under the correction of 
error standard. Gerhich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999); Orton v. Carter, 970 
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.., 47 P.3d 
92, 94 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) cert, granted, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002); Coulter & Smith v. Russell, 
976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 (2001): Excerpted here; included verbatim in the Addendum. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter 
within: 
(a) twelve months from the date of final completion of the original contract not 
involving a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or 
last furnished equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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102. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This is a mechanic's hen foreclosure action in which McKell seeks to recover the 
reasonable value of labor, materials, equipment, and services furnished to Carter Construction & 
Development, L.L.C. for the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision" project in Utah 
County, Utah. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. claims an interest in the property by virtue of a deed of 
trust recorded on January 5, 2000, after McKell started work. 
On November 21, 2001, McKell filed its complaint against Carter, Wells Fargo, and The 
Ranches, L.C. in the Fourth District Court to foreclose a mechanic's lien McKell recorded on 
November 2, 2000, and to obtain damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. (Record 
6). Wells Fargo answered and counterclaimed on January 28, 2002. (Record 41). McKell 
replied on February 11, 2002. (Record 47). On May 6, 2002, Wells Fargo filed its Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings and supporting memorandum. (Record 50 & 57). McKell filed its 
memorandum in opposition and the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson (a copy of which is included in 
the Addendum) on May 17, 2002. (Record 66 & 99). Wells Fargo filed its Reply Memorandum 
on May 29, 2002. (Record 77). Judge Laycock heard argument on the motion on June 26, 2002. 
(Record 81). Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, Judge Laycock granted Wells 
Fargo5s motion. (Record 82). 
Judge Laycock entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 30, 2002. 
(Record 89). The parties do not dispute the material facts, but McKell contests the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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15. Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code 
Ann. Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien 
claimant complete all work anticipated by the contract. While completing 
all work anticipated by a contract will meet the requirement of "final 
completion of an original contract" of Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation 
and abandonment by a mechanic's lien claimant of work to be performed 
under a contract also constitutes final completion of the original contract 
as anticipated by Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a). 
17. Since Section 38-1-7 of the Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien 
claimant to include the date on which the last work was performed in a 
recorded mechanic's lien, the date the last work was performed as 
contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic's Lien is the date from 
which the twelve (12) month period contained in Section 38-1-11(1 )(a) 
runs. 
18. McKell last furnished work on the Real Property on October 5, 2000. The 
twelve (12) month period during which McKell was required to file an 
action to enforce its lien began to run on October 6, 2000 and ended on 
October 5,2001. 
21. McKell's action to enforce its Mechanic's Lien against the Real Property 
was not brought within the required twelve (12) month period. 
22. Based upon McKell's failure to bring an action to enforce its claimed 
mechanic's lien within the twelve (12) month period, McKell's claimed 
mechanic's lien is invalid. 
(Record 84 - 86). 
The court's initial Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
certified as a final order on August 2, 2002. (Record 96). The parties filed a Stipulation as to 
Amount of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award on September 10, 2002. (Record 107). The court 
entered its Amended Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 18, 2002 and certified this order as a final order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
(Record 114). 
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II. Statement of Facts. 
The material facts are not in dispute and, with the exception of Facts 1,3, and 10, are 
drawn from the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Record 89). 
1. Carter was the owner or reputed owner of the real property and improvements 
constituting the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision" in Utah County, Utah. 
(Record 4, H15; 38, ^15). 
2. McKell entered into a contract (the Contract) with Carter to perform services and 
materials to the real property known as Friday's Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision located 
in Utah County (the Real Property). 
3. The total Contract price for the work, including a subsequent change order, was 
approximately $204,000.00. (Record 98, f4). 
4. Wells Fargo made a loan(s) to Carter, secured by a trust deed(s) on the Real 
Property, the trust deed(s) was executed on December 29, 1999, and recorded on January 5, 
2000. 
5. On or about January 3, 2000, McKell began work at the Real Property under its 
Contract. 
6. As McKell's work progressed, payments to McKell from Carter were extremely 
slow. After repeated attempts to receive progress payments for work completed, as 
contemplated by the Contract, McKell suspended work under the Contract on or about October 
5, 2000. 
7. At the time McKell suspended work, approximately $28,972.69 remained due and 
payable to McKell for work performed under the Contract. 
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8. As of October 5, 2000, the work anticipated by the Contract was not complete. 
For example, the amount of the original contract earmarked for the sidewalk portion of the site 
was $16,827.00, for which McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the work was to yet be 
performed. 
9. McKell negotiated with Carter in an attempt to receive payment for work 
performed prior to October 5, 2000. When Carter would not, or could not, pay for the portion of 
work completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's Lien on the Real Property. The Mechanic's 
Lien was recorded on November 2, 2000. 
10. McKell intended to complete the work under the Contract upon receipt of 
payment of the past due amount, and a guaranty of payment for the work yet to be completed. 
(Record 97). 
11. As of both October 5, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the work to be performed by 
McKell pursuant to the Contract had not been comple'ted. McKell has never completed all of the 
work it was anticipated to perform under the Contract. 
12. On November 21, 2001, McKell brought this action to, among other things, 
foreclose upon its Mechanic's Lien and have its Mechanic's Lien adjudged valid and prior to the 
lien(s) of Wells Fargo on the Real Property 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Laycock incorrectly interpreted the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
1 l(l)(a) (2001) to require McKell, as a matter of law, to file suit to enforce its mechanic's lien 
within twelve months after last furnishing labor, materials, equipment or services to the non-
residential construction project, or within twelve months after cessation or abandonment of work 
on the Project. The plain language of section 38-1-11(1 )(a) requires mechanic's lien claimants to 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
file suit to foreclose their mechanic's hen no later than twelve months after final completion of 
an original contract not involving a residence. The plain meaning of "final completion" is that a 
contract is not finally complete until everything required to be done under the contract is 
complete. There is no dispute McKelPs contract with Carter, the owner of the Project, was not 
finally complete on or before November 21, 2000. Consequently, McKell's lien foreclosure 
action, filed on November 21, 2001, was timely. This interpretation is consistent with the 
Legislature's intent when it enacted amendments to Utah's mechanic's lien statute which became 
effective in 1994 and 1995, and with Utah law. 
OVERVIEW OF AMENDMENTS TO THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
The mechanic's lien statute in effect before May 2, 1994, required lien claimants to 
record their mechanic's lien "within 80 days after substantial completion of the project or 
improvement" and to file suit to foreclose the lien "within twelve months after the completion of 
the original contract or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days." Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7(1) & 11 (emphasis added) Case law interpreting the version of section 38-
1-11 in effect before May 2, 1994 established a two-part test for determining the timeliness of 
the lien foreclosure action: first, whether the project was substantially complete; and second, 
whether the project was accepted by the owner. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). In 1994, the 
Legislature amended the statute to distinguish between residential and non-residential projects. 
In the 1994 General Session, Utah's elected representatives amended sections 38-1-7 and 
11, changing the triggering events and times for recording and foreclosing a mechanic's line 
dependent upon whether the project was residential or non-residential construction. Effective 
May 2, 1994, lien claimants were required to record their lien "within 90 days from the date the 
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person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or 
improvement" and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the date the lien claimant 
last performed labor and services or last furnished equipment or material on an original contract 
not involving a residence" or within "180 days from the date the hen claimant last performed 
labor and services or last furnished equipment or material for a residence..." 1994 Utah Laws 
Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11). These amendments 
remained effective until April 30, 1995, at which point the Legislature changed the statute again. 
In the 1995 General Session, the Legislature changed the triggering event for recording 
and foreclosing a mechanic's lien on a non-residential project. Effective May 1, 1995, lien 
claimants were required to record their lien within "90 days from the date... of final completion 
of an original contract not involving a residence..." and to foreclose the lien within "twelve 
months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence..." 
1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11) 
(emphasis added).1 
ARGUMENT 
I. McKell filed its mechanic's lien foreclosure action within the time 
allowed by the plain language of section 38-1-1 l-(l)(a). 
Because the McKell - Carter contract was not finally complete on or before November 
21, 2000, McKell's lien foreclosure action filed November 21, 2001, was timely according to the 
plain language of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a). The first step in understanding the intent of the 
legislature is to consider the plain language of the statute under review. Johnson v. 
The 2001 General Session amended section 38-1-11 yet again to add the current subsection (4), 
but those changes are not relevant to the issues before the court. 2001 Utah Laws 198 (S.B. 
254). 
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Redevelopment Agency, 913 P.2d 723 (Utah 1996). "According to traditional statutory 
interpretation methods, we look to the plain meaning of unambiguous statutory language." 
Pickett v. State, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "In construing a statute, we assume 
that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.' " Id, quoting Savage Indus, v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991); Cox Rock Prods, v. Walker Pipeline 
Constr., 752 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). . The court may look to dictionary definitions to 
determine the plain meaning of statutory language. "Utah courts have a iong history of relying 
on dictionary definitions to determine plain meeting.5 " Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C v. 
State, 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah 2001); quoting State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986 (Utah 1999). 
The Legislature intended for the time period within which a mechanic's lien claimant 
must file suit to foreclose the lien on a non-residential project to begin to run when the original 
contract between the contractor and owner is at its end. "Final" means "being the last of a series, 
process, or progress; of or relating to the ultimate purpose or result of a process." Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 463 (1984). "Completion" is defined as "the act or process of 
completing; the quality or state of being complete." Id at 269. "Complete" means "folly carried 
out." Id. Applying these definitions to section 38-1-11(1 )(a), all of the requirements under the 
original contract must be accomplished before the time to file suit to foreclose the lien on a non-
residential project begins to run. The Indiana Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in 
Moduform, Inc. v. HanyH. Verkler Contractor, Inc., 681 N.E.2d243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
There, the court was required to determine the legislative intent expressed in the Indiana statute 
requiring claimants on a public project payment bond to file their action on the bond "within 
sixty (60) days after the date of the final completion and acceptance of the public work." Id. at 
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247; quoting Ind. Code. § 36-1-12-13.l(d)(e). Looking to the plain language of the statute, the 
court concluded that final completion and acceptance "requires the project to be at its end. That 
is, all of the work under the original project must be finished before 'final completion and 
acceptance' can occur." Id at 248. Similarly, this court should apply the plain language test to 
section 38-1-11(1 )(a) and conclude that the time for a mechanic's lien claimant to file an action 
to foreclose a mechanic's lien on a non-residential project does not begin to run until all of the 
actions required by the original contract are finished. Because the McKell - Carter contract was 
not finally complete on or before November 21, 2000, McKell's lien foreclosure action filed 
November 21, 2001, was timely. 
This court should strictly construe the phrase "final completion of the original contract." 
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993), 
this the court upheld the validity of a liquidated damages clause which imposed a $600.00 per 
day assessment if "any work shall remain" under the contract beyond the contract completion 
date. Id. at 1370. The court reviewed the plain language of the contract and concluded it 
authorized UDOT to assess liquidated damages until the project was finally complete, rejecting 
the performance bond surety's contention that liquidated damages could not be assessed after the 
project was substantially complete. The court wrote "The contract between the parties does not 
consider substantial completion; rather, it considers final completion as determined by the 
UDOT engineer. There is no ambiguity about this point. [The contractor] and UDOT could 
have easily included the term and concept of'substantial performance' if they so intended." Id. 
In the present case, had the Legislature wanted to start the time within which to file a lien 
foreclosure action on a non-residential project at any time other than upon the "final completion 
of the original contract," it would have done so, as it did for residences. The trial court should 
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not, through a strained interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), be allowed to do what the 
Legislature specifically elected not to do. This court should reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
II. The plain language of section 38-l-l l( l)(a) does not require 
mechanic's lien claimants to file a foreclosure action within twelve 
months after a cessation or abandonment of the work. Judge Laycock 
committed reversible error when she read this requirement into the 
statute. 
Judge Laycock committed reversible error when she interpreted section 38-1-1 l-(l)(a) 
contrary to the plain language of the statute. After acknowledging the plain language of the 
statute "requires a mechanic's lien claimant to file an action to enforce its mechanic's lien within 
twelve (12) months from the date of final completion of the original contract" (Record 86), she 
ignored the plain language of the statute and erroneously concluded, as a matter of law, that 
Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien claimant complete 
all work anticipated by the contract. While completing all work anticipated by 
contract will meet the requirement of "final completion of an original contract" of 
Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation and abandonment by a mechanic's lien 
claimant of work to be performed under a contract also constitutes final 
completion of the original contract as anticipated by Section 38-1-11(1 )(a). 
(Record 85-86). 
The statute makes no mention of cessation, abandonment or suspension of work as being 
synonymous with final completion. In fact, the Legislature specifically deleted suspension of 
work as a triggering event for foreclosing a mechanic's lien when it amended section 38-1-11 in 
1994. 1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (deleting requirement for lien claimant to begin 
foreclosure action within twelve months after suspension of work for a period of at least 30 
days). Judge Laycock did not find that McKell materially ceased or abandoned work. Indeed, 
she could not so find because the undisputed evidence is McKell intended to continue work after 
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being paid for work previously performed and obtaining guarantees of payment for the 
remaining work. (Record 97). "The determination of what constitutes material abandonment is 
a factual issue." Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 
P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (summary judgment remanded for a determination 
whether project was materially abandoned precluding architect's lien from relating back to 
visible work on site). The Ketchum court noted with approval that a project was not materially 
abandoned despite "a significant cessation of work... due to reasons not unheard of in 
construction - loss of financing, failure to get a bond, and state approval..." Id., citing Frank J. 
Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780, 786 (Md. 1973). Judge Laycock's interpretation 
of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) reinstates language which Utah's Legislature specifically eliminated 
from the statute in 1994. Utah law prohibits a court from adopting an interpretation which 
rewrites a statute contrary to legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650, 655. This court should 
reverse Judge Laycock and remand for futher proceedings. 
III. The plain language of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) does not require a 
mechanic's lien claimant to file a foreclosure action within twelve 
months after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials or services to 
a project. Judge Laycock committed reversible error when she read 
this requirement into the statute. 
Judge Laycock erred when she concluded, as a matter of law, that "Since Section 38-1-7 
of the Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien claimant to include the date on which the last 
work was performed in a recorded mechanic's lien, the date the last work was performed as 
contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic's Lien is the date from which the twelve (12) 
month period contained in Section 38-1-11(1 )(a) runs." (Record 85). Applying her 
interpretation of the statute to the facts of this case, the trial court erroneously concluded, as a 
matter of law, that "The twelve (12) month period in which McKell was required to file an action 
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to enforce its hen began to run on October 6, 2000 and ended on October 5, 2001." (Record 85). 
Consequently, the court concluded McKell's action to foreclose its mechanic's lien was not filed 
within the twelve month period required by the statute, and as a result, ruled the hen invalid. 
(Record 84 & 85). The court's conclusion is completely contrary to the plain language of Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute, and strays from the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute. 
Judge Laycock's interpretation of the statute nullifies the 1995 amendments to Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute. In those amendments, the Legislature estabhshed different requirements 
for recording and enforcing a mechanic's lien based on the characterization of the project as 
residential or non-residential. Specifically, the Legislature required lien claimants on non-
residential construction projects to record their lien no later than 90 days after final completion 
of the original contract, and to file suit to foreclose the lien no later than twelve months after 
final completion of the original contract. Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (amendments codified 
at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-l-7(l)(b) & 1 l(l)(a)). For residences, the Legislature established not 
only different time periods within which lien claimants must take action, but also started those 
time periods running from a different event, specifically, the date the lien claimant last furnished 
labor, materials, equipment, or services to the residence. On a residence, lien claimants must 
record their lien no later than 90 days after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials, or 
services to the residence, and must file suit to foreclose the lien no later than 180 days after last 
furnishing labor, equipment, materials, and services. Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) & 1 l(l)(b). 
The Legislature could have required a lien claimant on a non-residential project to file a 
foreclosure action no later than twelve months after last furnishing labor, equipment, materials, 
or services to the non-residential project, but did not do so. In fact, the Legislature specifically 
deleted these events from triggering the running of the statute of repose for lien foreclosures on 
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non-residential projects when it amended the statute in 1995. Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115). 
Judge Laycock's interpretation of section 38-1-11(1 )(a) reinstates language which Utah's 
Legislature specifically eliminated. Utah law prohibits a court from adopting an interpretation 
which rewrites a statute contrary to legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650, 655. Judge 
Laycock's interpretation of section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) is completely at odds with the Legislature's 
amendments to Utah's mechanic's hen statute, and on this basis, the Utah Supreme Court should 
reverse her ruling and remand for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
McKell respectfully requests the court to reverse Judge Laycock and to remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this ^ L day of June 2003. 
PETERSON REED & WARLAUMONT L.L.C 
!ck W. Reed 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Counsel for R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
38-1-7 Notice of claim -Contents -Recording -Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of 
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a hen within 90 days from the date: 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project 
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102. 
(2) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom the lien claimant was employed or to whom the lien 
claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(e) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; 
(f) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(g) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of 
Documents; and 
(h) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as" defined in Section 38-11-102, a statement 
describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien 
claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), an acknowledgment or certificate is not required for any 
notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(4) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant, the copy of 
the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the 
affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes 
the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or record 
owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(5) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules governing the 
form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(h). 
a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38-1-11 Enforcement —Time for —Lis pendens —Action for debt not affected —Instructions and 
form affidavit and motion. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) 12 months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence 
as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for 
record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials famished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
(4) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a 
residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the residence to 
specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 
11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The lien claimant may file a notice to submit for decision on the motion for summary 
judgment. The motion may be ruled upon after the service of the summons and complaint upon 
the nonpaying party, as defined in Section 38-11-102, and the time for the nonpaying party to 
respond, as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, has elapsed. 
(c) The instructions and form affidavit and motion required by Subsection (4)(a) shall meet the 
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(d) If the nonpaying party, as defined by Section 38-11-102, files for bankruptcy protection and 
there is a bankruptcy stay in effect, the motion for summary judgment and the action to enforce 
the lien shall be stayed until resolution of the related claim under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form 
affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or 
enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
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Prior Versions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11 
Version effective from April 24, 1989 to May 2, 1994: 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording-Service on owner of property. 
(1) Each contractor or other person who claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 days after 
substantial completion of the project or improvement shall file for record with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner, 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3. No acknowledgment or certificate is required 
for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens-Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must be begun within twelve months after the 
completion of the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty 
days. Within the twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall file for record with the 
county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the 
action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of real property, 
or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action and the burden of proof 
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a 
debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to 
recover the same. 
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Versions effective May 2, 1994. 
1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) 
Ch. 308 
S.B. No. 87 
REAL PROPERTY-MECHANICS1 LIENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTION AND LIEN 
RECOVERY 
FUND ACT 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents-Recording—Service on owner of property. 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall within 90 days from the date the person 
last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project or 
improvement file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or 
some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment 
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for-Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) twelve months from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last 
furnished equipment or material on an original contract not involving a residence as defined in 
Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien claimant shall file for 
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record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the hen shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
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Versions effective May 1, 1995. 
1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) 
Ch. 172 
S.B. No. 115 
LENS-RESIDENCE LIEN RESTRICTIONS-LIEN RECOVERY FUND 
Section 1. Section 38-1-7 is amended to read: 
38-1-7. Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service on owner of property 
(1) A person claiming benefits under this chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of 
the county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to 
hold and claim a lien within 90 days from the date; 
(a) the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or material on a project 
or improvement for a residence as defined in Section 38-11-102, or 
(b) of final completion of an original contract not involving a residence as defined in Section 38-
11-102. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he tiirnished the equipment or 
material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor or service was performed or the first and last equipment 
or material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents. No acknowledgment 
or certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before April 24, 1989. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by 
certified mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of the real property a copy of the 
notice of lien. If the record owner's current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim 
may be mailed to the last-known address of the record owner, using the names and addresses 
appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of the county where the affected 
property is located. Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pendens—Action for debt not affected 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within: 
(a) twelve months from the date of final completion of the original contract not involving a 
residence as defined in Section 38-11-102; or 
(b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
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(2)(a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the hen claimant shall file for 
record with the county recorder of each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of the 
pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession 
of real property, or the hen shall be void, except as to persons who have been made parties to the 
action and persons having actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof shall be upon the hen claimant and those claiming under him to show 
actual knowledge. 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to whom a debt 
may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a personal action to recover the 
same. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON ERICKSON 
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Jack W. Reed, Utah Bar No. 4651 
Jerald V. Hale, Utah Bar No. 8466 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-4040 
Fax: (801) 364-4060 
Attorneys for QED and Roger Minor 
IN AND FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARTER CONSTRUCTION 
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C, a Utah limited 
liability company d.b.a. CARTER 
DEVELOPMENT; WELLS FARGO 
BANK, N.A., a national banking 
association; THE RANCHES, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; and, DOES 1-25, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF GORDON ERICKSON 
Civil No. 010405004 
Judge Taylor 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
[. Gordon Erickson, after first being duly sworn and upon oath do hereby state and depose as 
follows: \n>r\ 
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1. The contents of this affidavit are true and accurate based on my own personal 
knowledge. If requested to do so. 1 would so testify in a court of law. 
2. I am a resident of Salt Lake County and act as Controller for Plaintiff R. A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc. I have functioned in this capacity for approximately 4.5 years. 
3. As part of my position with McKell, I became involved with the contract between 
McKell with Carter Development for the improvement of the "Friday Station at Red Hawk Ranch 
Subdivision" in Utah County Utah. 
4. The scope of the work under the Contract included sewer line, water line, storm drain, 
and site work, including sidewalks. The total contract price for the work, including a subsequent 
change order, was approximately $204,000.00. 
5. On or about January 3, 2000 McKell began work under the Contract. 
6. As work progressed, payment from Carter was extremely slow. After repeated 
attempts to receive progress payments for work completed, as contemplated by the Contract, McKell 
suspended work under the Contract on or about October 5, 2000. 
7. At the time work was suspended, $28,972.69 remained due and payable to McKell for 
worked previously performed under the Contract. 
8. In addition, as of October 5, 2000, the sidewalk portion of the site work under the 
original contract remained to be completed. 
9. The amount of the original contract earmarked for the sidewalk portion of the site work 
was $16,827.00, for which McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the work was not yet performed. 
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10, McKell negotiated with Carter in an attemjp. to receive payment for work performed 
prior to October 5, 2000. When Carter would not, or amid not, pay for the ponion of work 
completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's Lien on the pjnnerty compromising the Project on 
November 2, 2000. 
1L As of November 2, 2000, the work underrne original contract between McKell and 
Carter had not been completed, and to date has not beemxnmpleted by McKell. 
12. Upon payment of funds and guaranty thaitiinds would be available to pay for 
remaining wok under contract, McKell has every intenticnT of completing the entire scope of work 
under the Contract. 
DATED this \£_ day of May 2002. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this (j^dmv rf May 2002. 
^ ANGIE COWLEY 
ffiT/WPUBUC* STATE of UTAH 
t$S NORTH 1330 WEST B-1 
OREHUT 84057 
COMMEXP 10-05-05 
i miliM 
KJ 
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* •* . 'i*i- ;n District Couii 
of Ut.ih Count\, State of Utah 
CAM MA B.. VM">\ • lerk 
Deputf 
J. Randall Call (0541) 
PRINCE, YEATES & Ghl ,U/Al i! .1 • 11 
Attorneys for Wells Fargo ]hv\ 
Northwest, N. A 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, i n ^ . P ' l 
(801) 524-1000 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COT JRT 
IN AND F< )k i i I * •.' 
:. -V MeKELL EXCAVATIiV 
i ah corporation, 
I\'J 
ml 
vs. 
CARTER CONSTRUCTION 
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a I Itah li in ited 
liability company d.b.a. Carter 
Development. L.J . .C; WELLS FARGO 
BANK, N.A.. a national banking 
association; MIL RANCHES, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability . . m ^ i , , -.:.( nnHS 1 25, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT ANT) 
CONCI X JSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010405004 
Judge Laycock 
E, YEATES 
DZAHLER 
e I, Suite 900 
t 400 South 
,ake City 
184111 
J24-1000 
Un oi about JM-P. \ 'oo • ^ ji- i ngoiitu- ^  \i o i , Pargo") filed a Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings ("fvlolinn"! pursuant to Utah Rules ot Civil Procedure, Ku'e I "'(c) 
Wells Fargo filed a Memorandum in Support ol IVlodon for Ji idgment on (he Plcadine-
("Memoranduni"). Plaintiff R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. ("JV •. \ i , » , 
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INCH, YEATES 
GELDZAHLER 
Centre I, Suite 900 
a East 400 South 
Salt Lake City 
Utah 84111 
801) 524-1000 
Opposing Wells Fargo Bank's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Memorandum in 
Opposition"). In support of its Memorandum in Opposition, McKell filed an Affidavit of 
Gordon Erickson ("Affiant"). Wells Fargo filed a Reply Memorandum ("Reply"). 
A hearing was scheduled and held on June 26, 2002, at 10:00 a.m., before this Court. 
J. Randall Call of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, appeared on behalf of Wells Fargo and Jack W. 
Reed of Peterson Reed L.L.C., appeared on behalf of McKell. 
Based upon the filing of the Affidavit in support of the Memorandum in Opposition, and 
in accordance with Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Motion has been 
treated by the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, having considered the Affidavit and having 
heard the arguments of counsel, and all facts having been construed in the favor of McKell, 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The following findings of fact are limited to consideration of Wells Fargo's Motion. 
Based upon the stipulation of counsel and the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson, the Court finds the 
following facts. 
1. McKell entered into a contract ("Contract") with Carter Development, L.L.C. 
("Carter") to perform services and materials to the real property known as Friday's Station at 
Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision located in Utah County ("Real Property"). 
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2. Wells K'tt'po made a lomHM li» f 'JIIIIT Devrlopmenl sceiiiril hy <i 'ri'sl dml!*:) *«i 
;he Real Property, the trust deed(s) was executed on December 29, 1999, and recorded on 
On or about J anuary 3, 2000, McKell began work at 'the Real Property under its 
("oiitlracl. 
4. As McKell' s work progressed, payments to McKell ft om Carter were extremely T 
slow. After repeated attempts to receive progress payments i^r work completed. ,is 
contemplated by the Contract, 'v:.-Ki - : .pi^ -n.,1 . - .. . 
5, 2000. 
5. At the l:i me McKell si ispended woi k, appi oxi mate ly $28,9 72,69 remained due 
and payable to McKell for work performed under the Contract. 
6. A' ' " vl ' * >' ** >! %< ii ; n *< y l the work, anticipated by the Contract was not complete 
For example- the amounl ni die original contract earmarked for the sidewalk p = 
• n. -\a;. >: - oi.\ I»»I vxiinh McKell had not yet billed Carter, as the wo ik * r noi ,v.\ 
performed. 
7. McKell negotiated with Carter in an attempt to receive payment for work 
performed prior to October 5, 2000. When-ranr? M ^ - » 
of work completed, McKell recorded a Mechanic's I ien on the Real Property. The Mechanic's 
Lj e n w a s recorded on November /' '00(1. 
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8. As of both October 5, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the work to be performed by 
McKell pursuant to the Contract had not been completed. McKell has never completed all of 
the work it was anticipated to perform under the Contract. 
9. On November 21, 2001, McKell brought this action ("Action") to, among other 
things, foreclose upon its Mechanic's Lien and have its Mechanic's Lien adjudged valid and 
prior to the lien(s) of Wells Fargo on the Real Property. 
10. Wells Fargo has incurred fees in defending against McKell's claims and in 
bringing the Motion. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
11. With respect to the Motion, there are no material disputed facts. 
12. The Court makes no interpretation of law regarding the applicability or non-
applicability of Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-1 l(l)(b) to the facts of this case. 
13. Utah Code Ann., Section 38-l-ll(l)(a) applies to the facts of this case. 
14. Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a) requires a mechanic's lien claimant to 
file an action to enforce its mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months from the date of final 
completion of the original contract. 
15. Final completion of an original contract as contemplated by Utah Code Ann., 
Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), does not require that a mechanic's lien claimant complete all work 
anticipated by the contract. While completing all work anticipated by a contract will meet the 
requirement of "final completion of an original contract" of Section 38-1-1 l(l)(a), the cessation 
-4-
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and abandonment by a mechanic's lien claimant of work to be performed under a contract also 
constitutes final completion of the original contract as anticipated by Section 3R * *1 (W.^ 
10. Snlioii IS I i h f lul" li" ,, nuf MM .iff!" 11itI \ fiiiiot l r tnferpiefnl !•• «i- ,u> •n.ii " 
mechanic's lien claimant has no cause of action to enforce a mechanic's lien unless and until the 
mechan ic's lien claimant performs all * "ork anticipated I: •} • the subject contract Si ich an 
interpretation would require mechanic'*- hen claimants to complete contracts even if the owner 
and/ oi . K •«. i-. '• *. v .- i.. • • i..:. ...Mitracts. 
Sinr.i/ Sirfinri sX \ 7 ul" tlic Utah Code Ann., requires a mechanic's lien claimant 
to include the date on which the last work was performed i n a recorded mechanic's lien, the 
date the last work was performed as contained in the recorded Notice of Mechanic' < 1 ini is I lie 
date from, which the twelve (12) month period contained in Section 38 i I W her- • m> 
18. McKell hisll luiiiishcd vumk on ilie k<\'il hnpcilv < 
twelve (12) month period during which McKell was required u* iile an action to enforce its lien 
began tc i i in :»! i October 6, 2000 and ended on October 5, 2001 
19 McKell filed its action to enforce its claimed Mechanic's Lien on November 21, 
200] , approxi mately foi ty seven (4 7) da.) "s af tei the October 5, 2001 date, 
20. 'riie penalty for not commencing an action to enforce a mechanic's lien within 
Hie dvelve mmilli jienod i'» invalidation of the lien Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738, 751 (Utah 1990). 
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21. McKell's action to enforce its Mechanic's Lien against the Real Property was not 
brought within the required twelve (12) month period. 
22. Based upon McKell's failure to bring an action to enforce its claimed mechanic's 
lien within the twelve (12) month period, McKell's claimed mechanic's lien is invalid. 
23. Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-18 provides that the successful party to a 
mechanic's lien action is entitled to receive its costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Dated this ffl_ day of July, 2002. 
COURT: 
Claudia Lay 
Court Judge 
c*n/c-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the /J2^ day of July, 2002, I caused a true and conect copy of 
the foregoing un-execi itecl FIN DINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF I , \ W t< > be 
mailed, first class postage prepaid thereon t<- \W. following: 
Jack W. Reed 
Jerald V. Hale 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
G:URC\DCXTS\wclL;i'argtAMcKcll\Findings and Conclusioris2.WTxl 
-7-
Q O 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING WELLS FARGO'S MO'IM >\ 1 ilR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
U 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pita, <f- g~(£L 
'-ourtr, Judicial D i s t rH r^ - f 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
C A R M A B . SMITH, Clerk 
•o-jty 
Randall Call (0541) 
; imes A. Boevers (0371) 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
\ilnrneys for Wells Fargo Bank 
Northwest, N.A. 
ity Centre I, Suite 900 
: 75 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 524-1000 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, S I A 1 k (>b I i'l'AH 
,\ MeKELL EXCAVATING, INC., a 
'irih corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARTER CONSTRUCTION 
DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company d.b.a. Carter 
Development, L.L.C.; WELLS FARGO 
H \NK, N. A . a national banking 
association; THE RANCHES, 1,C, a 
I Hah limited Inbibry company ,(iu! Hi )\ ..•• 
i 23, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
WELLS FARGO'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010405004 
Judge Laycock 
Wells Fart'..'- i v i < I !• 
Judgment on the Pleadings ("Motion") came befoie fhe <*'.>un -H. Imie 26, 2002, at 10:00 
a.m., for oral argument. B; :i; . i .in atfiii.ivi; I •. K \ McKell Excavating. 
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Inc. ("McKell") in opposition to the Motion, the Motion was considered and treated by this 
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Court as a motion for summary judgment in accordance with Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Wells Fargo was represented by J. Randall Call of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 
and McKell was represented by Jack W. Reed of Peterson Reed L.L.C. 
Having considered the pleadings and papers filed in support of and opposition to 
the Motion, having considered the Affidavit of Gordon Erickson and having heard and 
considered the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, and for the reasons 
contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered by this Court, 
and based on the Stipulation of Wells Fargo and McKell as to the amount of attorneys' fees 
and costs to be awarded Zions pursuant to paragraph 4, below, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Wells Fargo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, considered and 
treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is granted; 
2. Based upon McKell's failure to file its action to enforce its claimed 
mechanic's lien within twelve (12) months of last furnishing work on the Real Property, being 
October 5, 2000, McKell's mechanic's lien recorded on November 2, 2000, as Entry Number 
87075:2000, affecting the real property described on Exhibit "A" hereto ("Real Property"), is 
hereby invalidated and shall no longer be a lien upon the Real Property; 
3. McKell's First Cause of Action to enforce its mechanic's lien is dismissed 
with prejudice. McKell's remaining causes of action shall be unaffected by this Order; 
l*Ld Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4 . Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 38 1 18, Wells Fa rgo is awarded its 
reasonable a t torneys ' f ees ; trie! costs against Is IcKell in th : amoi int :>f $2. 400 00 ('" I 'w o 
Thousand F u n Hundred ! ><H 
5 . '' -i • : ' . - . i ;;e ei iter ed as a final jiid.giii.erit on 
iVIYKells c h u n s against Wells Fa igu , and Welh F a r g o ' s claims against McKel l in this act ion. 
*Vi .msi iiu. • ;;dci does not extend to McKell fs claims against defendants Car te r Cons t ruc t ion 
i K'v-.'lopinc/Mi, L . L . C . • •• <:- • •• • -• -' '' - > ' , ! ! • ••*- !1>,> 
against McKell , the summary judgment adjudicates fewer than ih *i il- mulupk riainis m ihe 
•
 ;
 • '* --.n! •• • (».: . * . • acnon. Consequently, mere is i:-.t 
jt.'Si reason ioi dcLw in entering final judgment on Wells Fargo's Motion because any 
prospective appeal relates only to the timeliness of McKell's lien foreclosure action. Further, 
resolution of the issues which remai n in the ti ial coi n t * ill not iiecessarily resolv 2 prospective 
appellate issues. Therefore, this Order granting defendant Wells Fargo Bank's Motion shall 
he and the same is lielemiiuul hi h< .1 Im.il jikkunenl puiMUiil In / uih A t /r /". vj(h) 
DATED this h<_ day of J^P, 2002. 
BY 1 1 IE COT I R I A l F / AT 
> Y 
Approved as to Form: 
U^ETERSON REED L.L.cT 
Jack W. Reed 
Attorneys for R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc 
$ '• '^..••^^'••J^HS^Bble Claudia Laycock 
& !• £ % ^ WMtrlHt Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the / day of September, 2002, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER GRANTING WELLS FARGO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon, 
to the following: 
Jack W. Reed 
Jerald V.Hale 
PETERSON REED L.L.C. 
321 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT 'A' 
Legal Description 
Lots 1 through 23, Inclusive, of Proposed Friday's Station at Red Hawk Ranch Subdivision, Plat 
"A", said Lots are to be Included within the following described property: 
Commencing at a point which is South 00«18'58" East 387.52 feet along Section line and East 
77434 feet from the West quarter corner of Section 20, Township 5 South, Range 1 West^ Sal 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence 170.018 feet along the arc of a ™ M % ^ £ ° % £ ? £ ? . 
left (chord bears South 8r09'59» East 166.14 feet); thence Northi 71«33'54 ^ 8 ^ 
thence 2 7 3 9 feet along the arc of a 171 foot radius curve to the left, * o r d b « . « . N o r t h 
76°09<16" East 2 7 3 6 feet); thence 39.46 feet along the arc of a SO foot radius curve to the left 
(chord bears North S8°08'13" East 38.44 feet); thence 106.10 feet along the arc of a_S0_foot 
radius curve to the right, (chord bears South 83°40'40" East 87.28 ^ ^ ^ ^ \ Q 
East 79.11 feet: thence North 71-0T43" E « t f " » ^ ' ^ ^
 3 7 5 67 ^ t h e n c e 
feet; thence South 22°33'45" West 18.82 feet; thence South 17 26 1 7 ^ ^ ' ° ' <,
 h 
North 71-40-37" West 78.04 feet; thence North 85°19'33" West 53.100 feet; thence: South 
73-16-39" West 349.92 feet; thence South 8 4 « 2 « 9 " West 79.94 feet; ^ " ^ " J 9 ^ ' 
West 133.25 feet; thence South W W West^0.91 feet; ^ ^ t h 0 20 06 W « t 91 
feet; thence South 71°33'54" West 45.71 feet; thence North 87 09 59 West ivo . , 
North 24=06'05" East 42.00 feet to the point of beginning. (To be known as Fnday s Station 
Red Hawk Ranch Plat "A") 
TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the above-described real P " * * ^ * ™ ^ ^ ^ S 
or hereafter vacated alleys and streets abutting the same, and all casements, rights of way. a ^ £ ™ ~ r ; . ^^
 ncts^ 
an absolute assignment of rents and the rights and authorities given herein to Lender to collect_ana ^ ^ ^
 m m 
royalties, mineraL oil and gas rights and profits, water, water rights, and water stock a ^ ^ V M > b a M m , muerUls. 
connection with the property, and all fixtures, machinery, equipment, engine*, b t a i « w j « • ° ^ ^
 o f w o r 
appliances, tangible personal property and goods of every moire whatsoever now or hereafter ^ V ^
 f applying or 
tended to ^ T used in connection with the property, including, but not limned to. those for the purposes ol^ P J ^ 
distributing heating, cooling, electricity, gas, water, air and light; and all elevators, and r c ^ ^ ^ r s water closed. 
Ore prevention and ooingriishing apparatus, security and access control apparatus, J ™ " ^ ! ™ ^
 c a ^ E c a < paaelhiig. 
dnki. awnings, storm windows. -.storm doors, screens. Winds, dudes, .curtain* a a ^ r t a i n r ^ . ^ S d o o r & £ & « all of 
rags, attached floor coverings; telephone equipment, trees and pktfi:. fence* .security systems ^ ^ J f T & e <~ l 
which, including replacements for. accessions. moduTcauoos. and additions thereto, shall be deemeo p« 
property covered by (his uasirumcoi. 
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